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This article discusses the use in England and Wales 
of expert evidence to compare digital images derived 
from surveillance camera photographs with facial 
images of a suspect. It argues that while such evidence 
has serious limitations the courts are right to admit 
it, but they are wrong to allow juries to convict on the 
basis of such evidence alone. The present law carries 
risks that juries will be over-persuaded by superficially 
compelling images.
One of the commonest forms of digital evidence in English 
trials comprises images, allegedly of the defendant, 
captured by the numerous surveillance cameras 
(commonly referred to as ‘CCTV’ although most systems 
in current use are not technically ‘closed circuit’)1  keeping 
watch over streets, homes and business premises in the 
UK.2  Although the majority of cameras still use analogue 
technology, digital cameras are gaining an increasing 
share of the market.3  The conversion of images from 
analogue to digital, and the use of low resolution to 
store large numbers of digital images, may significantly 
affect the quality of the evidence.4  Photographs and 
video footage constitute real evidence,5  that is, evidence 
that the jury can see for itself. The interpretation of the 
images, and in particular the identification of the people 
they show, is often a far from straightforward matter; 
and although computers may be used to enhance, rotate 
and measure the images, the matching of images always 
finally comes down to a matter of human judgment.6 
As explained by Rose LJ in Attorney General’s 
Reference (No 2 of 2002), there are four ways in which 
evidence of identity can be presented in such cases: (1) 
the jury can compare the image with the defendant; (2) 
a witness may claim to recognise the defendant; (3) a 
witness who has studied the images may give evidence 
comparing them to a photograph of the defendant; or 
(4) ‘a suitably qualified expert with facial mapping skills 
can give opinion evidence of identification based on a 
comparison between images from the scene, (whether 
expertly enhanced or not) and a reasonably contemporary 
photograph of the defendant’.7  The term ‘facial mapping’, 
coined by the press rather than by practitioners, covers a 
variety of techniques, practiced by people from a variety 
of branches of medicine (including medical art) and 
anthropology. The main methods are morphological (the 
visual comparison of facial features), anthropometric 
or photogrammetric (measuring distances and angles 
between facial ‘landmarks’) and video superimposition, 
in which an image that has been rotated and scaled to 
match an image of the suspect is ‘wiped’ across the 
suspect’s photograph.8 
That video images can be processed, displayed and 
stored in digital form is significant in two respects. First, 
methods such as video superimposition can be used to 
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the approach now favoured by the Court of Appeal of 
presenting the jury with digital images of the subject-
matter of forensic science testimony.9  Such ‘show-and-
tell’ evidence10  may be easy for juries to understand, 
but it carries the danger that the reasons for making an 
identification may be communicated much more clearly 
and powerfully than the reasons for doubt. As with 
other uses of visual technology in court, the obvious 
advantages of digital images need to be set against their 
potential prejudicial effects, of which defence lawyers 
in particular may not be sufficiently aware.11  Secondly, 
the storage of images in searchable databases12  raises 
the question of whether somebody could be prosecuted 
solely on the basis of a facial resemblance discovered in 
this way.
According to guidance issued by the Association of 
Chief Police Officers and the National Police Improvement 
Agency in 2009, facial recognition software available 
to the police, though it is ‘improving incrementally’ 
and is useful for investigative purposes, still relies on 
human judgment to compare the images and does not 
meet the ‘evidential threshold’ for admission in court.13  
There is no clearly defined ‘evidential threshold’ for the 
admissibility of expert evidence in English law,14  but the 
caution shown by the guidance is certainly warranted. 
Research on computer-aided facial identification suggests 
that its limitations derive not from any shortcomings of 
the software, but from a combination of two factors: the 
nature of faces, which can change significantly as a result 
of pose, health, expression, etc., so that even two images 
of the same person taken within a short time may differ 
more from each other than they do from some images of 
other people; and the lack of adequate information as 
to how common various combinations of facial features 
are in the population.15  When using surveillance camera 
images these factors are compounded by the often poor 
quality of the images,16  taken from a variety of angles 
and distances, of people in motion and often partly 
concealed. Variations in camera angle and distance can 
very significantly affect the apparent placing of facial 
‘landmarks’.17  Like other forms of forensic identification 
that depend on expert pattern-recognition (e.g. 
fingerprinting),18  facial identification may be susceptible 
to bias when experts know which face is expected to 
match a questioned image.19 
These factors have led some commentators, most 
notably a group of researchers in Australia headed by 
Professor Gary Edmond, to be strongly critical of the 
willingness of the English courts to admit ‘facial mapping’ 
evidence.20  One of the main concerns expressed by these 
authors is that a combination of expert testimony and 
the display of similar-looking images imposes a tactical 
burden on the defence to rebut the inference of identity. 
As in other areas of forensic science, defence lawyers with 
limited resources, knowledge and access to experts may 
fail to challenge effectively prosecution evidence that is in 
fact of doubtful validity.
The shortcomings of this particular form of evidence 
are by no means unique. As a major report from the 
National Academy Sciences concluded, ‘In most forensic 
science disciplines, no studies have been conducted of 
large populations to establish the uniqueness of marks or 
features. Yet, despite the lack of a statistical foundation, 
examiners make probabilistic claims based on their 
experience.’21  If there is a good case for excluding facial 
mapping evidence or severely restricting its scope, there 
may well be a comparable case for excluding or restricting 
many other kinds of expert evidence, including such well-
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established categories as fingerprints and handwriting 
identification.22
The difficulty with Edmond and colleagues’ position, 
however, is that for all its shortcomings ‘facial mapping’ 
evidence can hardly be worse than the alternatives set 
out in Attorney General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002).23  The 
risks inherent in letting the jury compare photographs for 
themselves, in witnesses testifying that they recognise 
the images, and in allowing police officers who have 
studied the images to interpret them for a jury, have been 
thoroughly explored by Ruth Costigan.24  But no-one 
argues that evidence that may actually show a crime in 
progress should be inadmissible, and once a jury see such 
images they are bound to ask themselves whether the 
person they show is or is not the person in the dock. If it is 
difficult to argue that no form of identification of a person 
shown on CCTV should be admissible, then it is difficult 
to see why expert evidence should be excluded while 
lay evidence is admitted or jurors are allowed to form 
their own impressions. As a leading US scholar argues, if 
‘we discriminate against expert testimony, we force the 
courts to rely on alternative types of evidence, notably lay 
testimony such as eyewitness identifications.’25 
‘Common Knowledge’
One principle that might appear to justify a preference 
for non-expert over expert evidence of identification is 
the ‘common knowledge rule’, that expert evidence is 
inadmissible on matters that the jury could judge for 
itself without expert help. The rule serves to reduce the 
complexity of the jury’s task, since it is often simpler, 
when one knows the relevant facts and has the necessary 
background knowledge, to draw an inference for oneself 
than to assess an expert’s competence to draw inferences 
from the same facts. It also avoids the risk that juries 
will uncritically defer to experts, allowing the experts 
to ‘usurp’ crucial decisions about the interpretation of 
evidence.26 
Roberts and Zuckerman argue that since a rigid 
‘common knowledge rule’ would render ‘facial mapping’ 
evidence inadmissible, given that the jury can see the 
photographs for itself, the very fact that such evidence 
is admitted shows that there is no such rule, but only 
a broad and flexible standard of ‘helpfulness’.27  In the 
leading case of R v Stockwell, however, the Court of 
Appeal took some pains to delineate a limited class of 
cases in which exert evidence would address matters 
beyond the competence of the jury:
‘Where ... there is a clear photograph and no suggestion 
that the subject has changed his appearance, a jury 
could usually reach a conclusion without help. Where, 
as here ... the appellant had grown a beard shortly 
before his arrest, and ... the robber may have been 
wearing clear spectacles and a wig for disguise ... 
expert evidence ... can provide the jury with information 
and assistance they would otherwise lack ...’28 
Similarly in R v Clarke, the Court of Appeal held that where 
‘real evidence’ – here the photographic images – ‘is not 
sufficiently intelligible to the jury without expert evidence, 
it has always been accepted that it is possible to place 
before the jury the opinion of an expert in order to assist 
them in their interpretation of the real evidence.’29 
This distinction is not always strictly enforced. In 
R v Nugent,30  where ‘the similarities and absence of 
distinguishing features in the clothing referred to were 
obvious to the lay eye and scarcely required to be attested 
by expert evidence’ the court nevertheless accepted 
that ‘having the points made through evidence in chief 
from the mouth of an expert witness was a useful and 
time-saving exercise by way of presentation’. The court 
appeared untroubled by the dicta in Stockwell and Clarke 
since comparing images of clothing was ‘not a facial 
mapping exercise’.31 
The common knowledge rule has been developed 
mainly in relation to evidence about mental states. Since 
a defendant’s past mental state is inaccessible to any kind 
of direct observation, so it is impossible to demonstrate 
that experts are better at identifying such states than 
other people.32  Given that the law makes these elusive 
states a criterion of criminal liability, it is hard to see a 
fairer way of ascertaining them than to leave to the matter 
to the jury’s ‘common sense’. By contrast, it is possible 
to ascertain how accurate people are in identifying faces. 
The results are not encouraging for those who advocate 
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leaving the task to juries.33  Judges who assert that 
identifying people in photographs or videos is a task most 
people perform competently in everyday life34  overlook 
the difference between the recognition of photographs 
of familiar people, at which research subjects perform 
remarkably well, and identification of strangers, at which 
they tend to do very badly.35  Jurors, it seems, need all 
the help they can get in identifying unfamiliar faces. The 
question is whether professed experts possess skills of 
recognition that jurors lack.
Two recent, small-scale studies shed some light on 
this question. One, by Lee and others, found that mere 
completion of a master’s course in human identification 
conferred no significant advantage when it came to 
identifying poor-quality CCTV images.36  In the other, 
Wilkinson and Evans, two facial imaging analysts, 
arranged a ‘blind’ trial of their own ability to identify faces 
on CCTV compared with the performance of a group of 
61 students representing the public. They were no doubt 
relieved to discover that they did significantly better than 
the ‘public’ group who, when the ‘target’ face was not 
among those shown to them, identified someone else 
more often than they responded correctly. But in both the 
‘target present’ and the ‘target absent’ tests there was 
one face that both experts independently, but wrongly, 
identified as the ‘target’. Evidence that two experts had 
independently picked the same individual from amongst 
several ‘foils’ could have been all too persuasive in a 
criminal trial.37  
If the main test for admissibility is simply whether 
the expert has knowledge or skills that the jury lack, 
Wilkinson and Evans’ findings are clearly germane at 
least to the admissibility of the authors’ own evidence 
(whether the findings can be generalized to anyone else 
is debateable). As Edmond and colleagues point out, 
however, whether experts perform better than hopelessly 
unskilled laypeople is a different question from whether 
their evidence is reliable.38 
‘Ultimate issues’
Another supposed common-law restriction on expert 
evidence is the ‘ultimate issue rule’, which prohibits the 
expert from ‘usurping the function of the jury answering 
the very question which it [is] the jury’s and only the jury’s 
province to decide.’39  That this rule was ever thought to 
apply to facial comparison evidence may be due to some 
careless talk by the expert witness in R v Stockwell, who 
opined that ‘the photos strongly support the view that 
the suspect and the robber are the same man.’ Whether 
the defendant was a robber was, of course, the ‘ultimate 
issue’, not whether he was the man in the photographs. 
As the court recognised, however, since it was undisputed 
that the photographs showed a robbery in progress, the 
distinction between ‘ultimate’ and ‘non-ultimate’ issues 
was ‘a matter of form rather than substance’.40   What 
was important was that jury must be clearly told that the 
decision was for them, not for any expert.
The ultimate issue rule was revived in a modified form 
in R v Gray.41  Mitting J disapproved of experts’ expressing 
‘strong support’ for conclusions about identity – not 
because identity was formally the ‘ultimate issue’, but 
because the jury lacked an adequate basis on which to 
decide what weight to put on the expert’s inference. Until 
better evidence of the validity of such inferences, such 
as a database of facial characteristics, was available, 
experts should go no further than pointing out similarities 
between faces, leaving juries to draw their own 
conclusions about their significance.42 
Gray, like the similar decision of the New South 
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Tang,43  was 
an unsatisfactory compromise between admission 
and exclusion, and the Court of Appeal’s subsequent 
unwillingness to follow it is understandable.44  It is 
true that the jury has no objective basis on which to 
assess the probative value of the expert’s opinion, but it 
equally lacks an objective basis on which to evaluate any 
similarities the expert points out. The distinction between 
pointing out similarities and expressing an opinion that 
they support a finding that two images are of the same 
face looks like another difference of form rather than 
substance. In any event, the Court of Appeal in R v Atkins 
not only disapproved Mitting J’s obiter dicta in Gray but 
also flatly denied the existence of the ultimate issue rule.45 
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Reliability 
Is facial mapping reliable enough to be admitted in 
evidence? A formulation of the test for admissibility that 
is frequently quoted in the English courts comes from the 
South Australian case of Bonython: ‘whether the subject 
matter of the opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or 
experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized 
to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or 
experience’.46  If this were interpreted strictly it would 
be a considerable hurdle for facial mapping evidence to 
get over. What makes a body of knowledge ‘sufficiently 
organized’ to be ‘reliable’, one might think, is the 
existence of body of techniques and theories that have 
been subjected to rigorous research.47  That is a far cry, 
however, from the cursory fashion in which the test is 
used in the one English Court of Appeal decision to apply 
it to facial mapping evidence. In R v Ciantar, Moses LJ 
simply asserted that it ‘could not be suggested’ that facial 
mapping was not a reliable body of knowledge.48  The 
experts were ‘permitted to give their evidence because 
they have experience, sophisticated equipment, time and 
skill in such identification techniques’ – none of which 
guarantees that their techniques are any more reliable 
than, say, phrenology. The judge’s task was merely to 
‘determine whether the evidence is such as to entitle the 
jury to consider it. Thus if there is expert evidence capable 
of acceptance it is not for the judge to withdraw it from 
the jury merely because there is other evidence which 
contradicts it.’49 
Moses LJ’s approach has at least the merit of being 
consistent with R v Luttrell, which while endorsing 
the Bonython test also held that no ‘enhanced’ test 
of reliability was required beyond the ‘ordinary tests 
of relevance and reliability’.50  The meaning of this is 
somewhat obscure, but for a clearer guidance we may 
turn to R v Buckley,51  the leading case on the admissibility 
of fingerprint evidence. There, Rose LJ explained that 
such evidence ‘is admissible as matter of law if it tends 
to improve the guilt of the accused’, and it may so tend 
even if it is of limited weight because of the poor quality 
of the print; but prosecution evidence which is otherwise 
admissible may be nevertheless be excluded under the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s. 78, on the ground 
that its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value (see 
below).
The leading case on the admissibility of facial mapping 
evidence is now Atkins v R.52  Here the Court of Appeal 
confirms that the criterion for admissibility is that the 
evidence must be ‘based upon specialised experience, 
knowledge or study’. It acknowledges that there ‘can be 
proper anxiety about such evidence, particularly where it 
is “novel”’, but adds:
‘The three principal remedies are (i) to have such 
evidence examined and, if appropriate, criticised by an 
expert of equal experience and skill, (ii) to subject the 
evidence to rigorous testing in the witness box and (iii) 
to ensure careful judicial exposition to the jury of the 
difference between factual examination/comparison 
or arithmetical measure on the one hand and, on the 
other, a subjective, but informed, judgment of the 
significance of the findings.’53 
These remedies have obvious shortcomings. Having the 
evidence examined by someone with the same kind of 
experience and skill as the first expert begs the question 
of whether that kind of experience and skill yields reliable 
knowledge. The ‘rigorous testing’ of the expert evidence 
in the witness box depends on defence lawyers having the 
skill, motivation and resources to probe the weaknesses 
of the evidence and expose them effectively. And it is 
unclear whether warning the jury about the ‘subjective 
but informed’ nature of the evidence will be effective. In 
their US mock jury experiments, McQuiston-Surrett and 
Saks found that ‘Whether or not the jurors were informed 
about the limitations of microscopic hair examination on 
cross-examination or by the judge had little measurable 
or meaningful impact on their judgments’. 54
There can, however be little doubt that facial 
comparison evidence crosses at least the ‘low threshold’ 
for admissibility of being ‘such that a jury properly warned 
could place some weight on it’.55  Despite the limited 
scientific evidence for the reliability of facial mapping, it 
is not unreasonable for judges and juries to think that the 
experience of experts is likely to give them some ability to 
make accurate judgments. By analogy with other forms of 
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expertise,56  the hypothesis that expert observers of facial 
photographs acquire an ability to perceive similarities 
and differences that would escape a novice seems highly 
plausible, though it has certainly not been adequately 
tested.57  The question, then, is not so much whether 
facial mapping evidence is sufficiently reliable to meet 
a test of bare relevance, but whether despite meeting 
that test it ought to be excluded on the ground that its 
prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value. Hughes LJ 
in Atkins gave remarkably little consideration to s. 78, 
merely observing that it was not the source of the court’s 
power to exclude unreliable evidence, although it might 
‘additionally be relevant in some cases’.58  This is not to 
say that Hughes LJ was insensitive to the danger that 
expert evidence might be prejudicial in the sense that 
deference to expert authority might lead the jury to give 
it undue weight. He considered, however, that the way 
to counter the risk of prejudice was by a judicial warning 
rather than by excluding the evidence.
Warnings 
There is now considerable authority that jurors should 
be warned of the need for caution in accepting facial 
mapping evidence. In R v Briddick, where the trial judge 
remarked that the evidence was ‘perhaps less scientific 
than one might have imagined’, the Court of Appeal 
accepted that the ‘judge could, and perhaps should, have 
given an even more stronger [sic] warning to the jury to 
view with caution’.59  In another case dealing with the 
same expert, the court approved the trial judge’s warning 
that:
‘It is important that you should be cautious in your 
approach to evidence which claims to make an 
identification to a high degree of probability. .... You 
cannot test his results in the way in which an examiner 
can test a student’s examination paper in mathematics, 
and ... an honest witness who is mistaken can be very 
persuasive or can appear to be very persuasive.’60 
In Atkins the court pointed to the general need for a 
warning about the scale of measures of support61  (such as 
‘strong’ or ‘powerful support’ for identification) commonly 
employed by facial comparison experts:
‘the fact that a conclusion is not based upon a statistical 
database recording the incidence of the features 
compared as they appear in the population at large 
needs to be made crystal clear to the jury.’62 
Despite its generally negative findings about the effect 
of warnings on research subjects playing the role of 
jurors (known as ‘mock’ jurors), the study by McQuiston-
Surrett and Saks also affords some grounds for optimism. 
When the hair comparison expert admitted that he could 
only give his ‘best subjective estimation’ as to how 
common a certain type of hair was in the population, 
mock jurors attached significantly less weight to his 
evidence than when he used terms lack ‘match’ or 
‘similar in all microscopic characteristics’.63  This is the 
very point that the warnings required by Atkins and other 
cases are intended to convey. It should also be made 
clear in the expert’s own evidence, bearing in mind the 
requirement that an expert’s report must ‘if the expert is 
not able to give his opinion without qualification, state 
the qualification.’64  If expressions like ‘lends powerful 
support’ are to be used, they should always be prefaced 
with a qualifications such ‘based on my subjective 
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estimate (or perhaps better: my informed guess) of the 
rarity of similar features in the population ...’
Sufficiency of evidence 
To set the Atkins judgment in context, it is important 
to appreciate the strength of the circumstantial evidence 
implicating the defendants. A man called Carty, who 
died before the trial, was linked to the crime by DNA 
evidence and it was common ground that he was one 
of the perpetrators. The brothers were with Carty – 
who had helped Dean Atkins to abscond from an open 
prison – shortly before and after the crime; and Dean 
Atkins had shown off a distinctive ring matching the 
description of one of the stolen items.65  It would have 
been an astonishing coincidence, even allowing for optical 
distortion and other problems, for any other robber to 
resemble so closely the very person to whom so much 
other evidence pointed. The situation is different in 
cases where the facial comparison evidence is the sole 
or main evidence against the defendant. Here the issue 
is whether the case ought to be left to the jury: whether 
facial mapping evidence meets the Galbraith test that 
the evidence ‘taken at its highest’ is sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to convict.66 
It might be thought that evidence that comes with the 
qualifications and warnings that the Court of Appeal has 
found to be applicable to facial comparison evidence 
could seldom if ever meet that test. It might be supposed 
that evidence that comes, or ought to come, with all those 
caveats attached could never be sufficient to secure a 
conviction by itself. But as Tuckey LJ remarked in R v 
Mitchell, by the same logic, ‘it would not be possible to 
convict a defendant on the identification evidence of a 
single witness and we all know that this often happens.’67 
It may often happen, but according to the leading 
case of R v Turnbull it should happen only where the 
evidence is of good quality, ‘as for example when the 
identification is made after a long period of observation, 
or in satisfactory conditions by a relative, a neighbour, 
a close friend, a workmate and the like’.68  This was the 
Court of Appeal’s somewhat diminished version of the 
Devlin Report’s recommendation that unless there were 
‘exceptional circumstances’ or other evidence to support 
the identification, the jury should be directed to acquit.69  
Where identification is based on observation – however 
prolonged and careful – of a poor quality video, or a better 
quality image of a concealed or disguised face, it is surely 
contrary to the spirit of both Devlin and Turnbull to allow 
the evidence to go to the jury simply because the witness 
expresses a high degree of confidence in an identification. 
The ‘trial judge’s duty to withdraw the case from the jury 
in an identification case is wider than the general duty of a 
trial judge in respect of a submission of no case to answer 
as enunciated in Galbraith’.70  As Lord Mustill explained in 
Daley v R, the guidance in Galbraith was intended to stop 
judges substituting their own judgment of the credibility 
of a witness for that of the jury, whereas in ‘fleeting 
glimpse’ identification cases, ‘the case is withdrawn from 
the jury not because the judge considers that the witness 
is lying, but because the evidence even if taken to be 
honest has a base which is so slender that it is unreliable 
and therefore not sufficient to found a conviction’.71  
The same principle ought to lead to the withdrawal of 
prosecutions that depend solely, or almost solely, on 
untested forms of expertise.
In two cases the Court of Appeal has found that facial 
comparison evidence, in conjunction with other evidence, 
insufficient to satisfy the Galbraith72  test for a case to 
answer. In R v Buckland,73  it held that a ‘70 per cent 
sure’ identification by the victim, coupled with ‘strong 
support’ for an identification by two experts and a lie 
told by the defendant after arrest, did not amount to 
a case to answer. In R v Mulgrew, the court held that 
although a police officer’s evidence of having recognised 
the suspect on a CCTV still was by itself a sufficient 
basis for conviction, it had been a misdirection to tell 
the jury that an expert’s evidence that the suspect could 
‘not be eliminated’ on the basis of image comparison 
provided ‘some support, albeit limited’ for the officer’s 
identification:
‘it was as plain as a pikestaff that there were general 
similarities between the man shown in the photograph 
and the man which P.C. Whittaker purported to 
recognise. It added nothing to the recognition of 
the officer to say or assert whether as an expert or 
otherwise that the appellant could not be eliminated as 
a candidate.’74 
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Mulgrew is probably the only case where the Court of 
Appeal has underestimated the probative value of ‘facial 
mapping’ evidence. There must have been some chance 
that if the constable was mistaken, a competent expert 
would have noticed some difference between the two 
faces. A failure to eliminate the suspect was more likely 
if the constable was right than if he was wrong, and thus 
his not being eliminated did have some probative value in 
support of the identification.
In R v Hookway, the Court of Appeal relied on two 
aspects of the medical artist Richard Neave’s evidence 
in holding that his finding of ‘very powerful support’ for 
identification was by itself sufficient to justify conviction. 
One was that he had explained to the jury how he reached 
his conclusions – but it is difficult to see how merely 
understanding his methods could justify the jury in being 
sure of his results. The other was that Neave ‘conceded 
that, if a trawl were made through Manchester, it might 
be possible to find one or two other people of similar 
appearance’.75  Leaving aside the fact that Neave’s ‘one or 
two’ could be no more than a guess, and even if it could 
be safely assumed that the robber was a Mancunian, 
the evidence at best showed that Hookway was one of a 
small number of possible suspects. Mike Redmayne has 
suggested that this objection is not convincing because 
the jury might reasonably assume that Mr Hookway was 
not plucked at random from the streets of Manchester, 
and this is the kind of common-sense generalisation 
that jurors can properly bring to bear on that evidence.76  
Whether juries should be free to convict on the basis 
of speculation about reasons for suspicion that are not 
supported by admissible evidence is certainly debateable, 
but in addition the existence of searchable databases 
makes it at least theoretically possible that a suspect 
could be identified purely on the basis of his resemblance 
to a video image.
While Hookway was apparently a case where the 
photographic evidence was of unusually good quality,77  
the same was not true of R v Weighman, where the expert 
was prepared to say only that
‘the quality of the CCTV in the garden was quite 
good. He found 13 points of similarity between the 
compared images of the offender and the appellant, 
and no dissimilarities. Had he of course identified 
dissimilarities, then that would have allowed the 
appellant to be excluded. Conversely, he could find no 
unique identifying feature which would allow a positive 
identification.’78 
The witness considered that these features provided 
‘strong support’ for the proposition that the defendant 
was the man in the video, but this was only the third point 
on the five-point scale he adopted, from ‘no support’ to 
‘extremely strong support’. The Court of Appeal found 
that this evidence ‘taken together with the fact that 
the jury were able to look at these images themselves’ 
was sufficient to justify conviction.79  But whatever the 
jury could see for themselves was only what the expert 
could see and point out to them, and the same set of 
resemblances cannot legitimately be counted twice, 
nor can the jury’s impression of them reasonably be 
considered more powerful evidence than that of the 
expert. Weighman well illustrates the dangers of digital 
images – that they may wrongly be seen as independent 
and compelling confirmation of an expert’s finding; and 
that they could in theory, though probably not in current 
prosecution practice,80  lead to convictions based solely 
on a ‘hit’ in a database of facial images.
A way forward
The Law Commission’s report on Expert Evidence in 
Criminal Trials in England and Wales proposes a the 
following ‘core test’ of admissibility:
expert opinion evidence is sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted if—
(a) the opinion is soundly based, and
(b) the strength of the opinion is warranted having 
regard to the grounds on which it is based.81  
It is apparent from the Law Commission’s comments 
on forensic techniques such as ‘earprint’ evidence that 
they envisage this test being applied in a way that would 
allow evidence based on methods that had been subject 
to little or no testing to be left to the jury provided 
that the ‘strength’ of the opinion went no further than 
was ‘warranted’. Thus the sort of evidence given in 
Weighman – that the expert’s ‘subjective opinion’ based 
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on ‘extensive experience’82  that there were no observable 
differences between two faces but nothing that would 
allow a positive identification – would still be admissible. 
If the actual decision in Weighman can be dismissed as 
an aberration – perhaps influenced by the judges’ own 
impression that images shared ‘characteristics which 
could not be described as average in any sense’83  – then 
such evidence ought to be considered insufficient to 
support a conviction on its own, but capable of supporting 
a case based on other evidence.
Unfortunately, because of its cost implications, there is 
no immediate prospect of the Law Commission report 
being implemented.84  However, the main effect of the 
‘core test’, namely to render inadmissible any statement 
of opinion that is stronger than is warranted by the 
grounds on which it is based, could be achieved under 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s. 78. Such a 
statement clearly has a potentially prejudicial effect – that 
the jury will accept it at face value – and has no probative 
value whatever beyond that of a suitably qualified 
statement. Following Buckley, it should therefore, if 
adduced on behalf of the prosecution, be excluded on 
the ground of fairness. The decision in Atkins and the 
Criminal Procedure Rules also point to the importance 
of expressing evidence in terms that are suitably 
qualified and which also set out the ‘range of opinion 
on the matters dealt with in the report’ (which should 
include the highly critical views of some well-qualified 
commentators on facial mapping).85  Taken together with 
a rigorous application of the Galbraith test as interpreted 
in Daley, this would achieve much the same results as 
the Law Commission test. Clearly this would not go far 
enough for some critics of forensic science evidence, but 
it would ameliorate the worst dangers involved in facial 
comparison evidence.
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